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WILLIAM PARSONS and DOUGLAS MATHEWS*
The Californiazation of Arizona
Water Politics
ABSTRACT
The Californiazation of Arizona water politics is a comparison of
policy decisionmakers in Western water politics. Patterns of water
allocation suggest that Western water policy is best explained as
cooperation among the few. These elites establish the values, deter-
mine the agenda, and control conditions under which water policy
is made. Elite control of water policy is identified by strategies,
tactics, and systems maintenance that work to limit challenges to
elite water policy. To demonstrate the durability of elites, four stages
of Western water development are examined: the foundation of elites
(1880s-1920s), the rise of the elites (1920s-1930s), the golden age
of concrete (1930s-1960s), and an era of maintaining elite controls
(1970s-present). During each phase how water users in California
andArizona respond to the political conditions of the time is assessed.
In the West, a small group of growth and development interests comes
to dominate water policy. Furthermore, water policy making in Ari-
zona resembles water policy making as practiced in Southern Cali-
fornia, particularly in the continued control of the water agenda.
INTRODUCTION
When the Arizona Groundwater Management Act became law in 1980,
many observers of Western water policy viewed the legislation as a pro-
gressive reform signaling a new era of participation in the water policy
process. The Act is often touted as a reflection of increasing environmental
sensitivity, fiscal responsibility, and awareness of water users ignored by
traditional water allocation processes. However, closer examination re-
veals that groundwater "reforms" have instead institutionalized the values
and allocation priorities of the traditional water resources development
policy network. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the Groundwater
Act enhances the growth and development plans of Phoenix. Other water
users such as environmentalists, small farmers, and the native American
(who hoped to benefit from a law which would bring the Central Arizona
project) are still struggling to find institutions or structures through which
*William Parsons is Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Ambrose. Douglas Mathews
is currently a Graduate Student of Political Science at the University of Arizona.
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to alter the Phoenix dominated water agenda. However, the dominance
of a Western urban center in water policy is not unique to Phoenix. A
similar water political structure has long been a key factor in the growth
and development of Los Angeles. In this case, the Metropolitan Water
District has fashioned a water policy that promotes the water needs of
Los Angeles over all other water interests. In California, the defeat of
the Peripheral Canal is also seen as an environmental victory. Neverthe-
less, the position of the Metropolitan Water District as the de facto water
agency for Southern California remains unquestioned. These patterns of
water allocation suggest that Western water policy is best explained as
cooperation among the few.
These elites establish the values, determine the agenda, and control
the conditions under which water policy is made. The importance of an
elite influence in water policy is often overlooked in studies of Western
water policy due to their emphasis on policy as a reflection of pluralism.
Rather, Western water policy can be observed as elite cooperation and
subtle coercion which limits participation in actual policy decisions. Re-
gardless of the "openness" of the decisionmaking structures, elite control
of Western water policy continues through strategies, tactics, and systems
maintenance that work to thwart challenges to elite water policy. This is
in stark contrast to the pluralist model which argues that creating insti-
tutions and altering decisionmaking patterns is the master key to policy
reforms.
Furthermore, the presence of elite water policy is observed by exam-
ining their durability over time. Pluralist studies too often attempt to
measure policy success and failure through single conflicts or isolated
cases. In contrast, if Western water actors are evaluated by their contin-
uous involvement in water decisions, then the field of key or long term
participants is very small.
To display the durability of elites four stages of Western water policy
are examined: the foundation of elites, the rise of elites, elites in their
heyday (the Golden Age of Concrete), and elites maintaining the decision
structures. The four phases are simply guidelines of historical eras of
water resources development in the West. Within each, water users are
examined as to how they respond to the political conditions of the time.
Those interests who adapt over time are called the "core elite." Water
interests who rise and fall are basically "semi-core" actors. Water interests
who are unable to make inroads to the core elite policy network are
identified as peripheral or non-elites. The framework is tested in Southern
California and Arizona.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSPECTIVE
Elite theory suggests that public policy reflects the preferences of a
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small set of decisionmakers, not the general public. Classic elite theory
emphasizes the predominant role of industrial and financial interests in
determining public policy.' Writers in the field of Western water resources
have implied an elite political environment, noting that water policy often
suffers from a lack of participation.' The short coming of these works is
their focus on institutional barriers to participation rather than identifying
the key political actors, or "elites," that fashion and dominate these
institutions. Part of the reason elites in water policy go relatively unnoticed
is their use of "gatekeeping" and systems maintenance political structures.
These control mechanisms relegate many water interests to symbolic
participation in water policy.' In analyzing Western water politics, we
contend that elite theory offers an indispensable perspective for three
main reasons. First, historically, it is a small group of men who establish
the decision rules for water policy. Despite efforts to expand participation
to include groups such as environmentalists, there has been little change
in the pattern of water allocation that encourages urban growth and de-
velopment. We contend that urban growth via water augmentation dom-
inates the Western water policy. It is the influence of urban growth values
in Western water policy that leads to an "elitist" political setting.4
Secondly, we argue that elite interests capture water policy agencies
and effectively practice self-regulation. In contrast, more open institu-
tions, such as state legislatures, exist to create the illusion of participation.
Symbolic responses in state legislation and the screening of demands
through "gatekeeping" are indicative of the politics of Western water
elites. For example, we will demonstrate that laws such as the 1980
Arizona Groundwater Management Act directly serve elite urban growth
and development values and only symbolically address interests in favor
of conservation, environmentalism, and growth control.
Lastly, the elite perspective permits an examination of emerging elites
in water politics. Newer economic interests, such as the hi-tech industry,
are being integrated into the water elite camp. The influence of agriculture,
a traditional partner among the elite, is diminishing relative to the other
elites. The eclipse of one part of the elite is not necessarily a signal of
the system's demise. Water elites engage in self-replacement as well as
self-regulation. In fact, the decline of agriculture is further indication that
there is a water elite limiting the number of values seriously considered
in Western water policy.
1. C. Mills, The Power Elite (1956); T. Dye & H. Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (1981).
2. See M. Reisner, Cadillac Desert (1986); D. Worster, Rivers of Empire (1985); W. Kahrl, Water
and Power (1982); 1. Cooper, Aqueduct Empire (1968); R. Nadeau, The Water Seekers (1950); A.
Hoffman, Vision or Villany (1981); C. McWilliams, Southern California (1948).
3. H. Ingram, N. Laney, & J. McCain, A Policy Approach to Political Representation: Lessons
From the Four Corners States (1980); C. Edelman, Symbolic Uses of Politics (1964).
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In summary, an elite perspective reveals the primacy of the urban
growth and development ethic in Western water policy. Observed from
this vantage point, our study examines several implications of the elite
control of water policy. (1) Water policy institutions, although regulatory
in structure, are dominated by a few economic elites with bureaucracy
serving to assist elites in the politics of self-regulation. (2) Members of
the elite cooperate to keep their growth and development agenda hidden
from direct public scrutiny. (3) Elites use subtle political coercion such
as symbolic legislation to reduce the influence of alternative water policy
proposals such as conservation and environmental protection. (4) Water
elites are skillful at creating the illusion of participation by bringing into
the fold the hi-tech community while phasing out agriculture, thus keeping
a narrow policy focus and avoiding real cutbacks in water use. (5) In
evaluating the urban growth and development ethic, participants in water
resources policy need to be examined over time affording the opportunity
to distinguish key political actors in urban growth from single event (short
term) participants.
The more commonly used pluralist model fails to adequately address
the implications of water policy guided by urban growth and development.
Pluralism emphasizes expanding participation and assumes all who par-
ticipate bargain away some of their values to produce a consensus or
compromise.5 However, the emergence of Los Angeles as a metropolis
and a population boom in Phoenix offer little evidence that water policy
in the West reflects values other than urban growth and development.
Most studies of Western water policy rely on a pluralist perspective and
focus on current issues, formal institutions handling the issue, and the
number of access points to encourage participation. 6 The conclusion of
these studies is generally the same. The pluralist answer argues that until
participation is broadened, the structural/procedural reforms of the 1970s
environmental movement are destined to be ineffective. In contrast, an
elite perspective suggests that even if participation is expanded there is
in the West an urban elite that adapts to periodic political pressures without
giving up its "core" growth and development goals.
By identifying a water elite, it becomes clearer that participation alone
cannot guarantee policy that speaks to a broader set of values. The open
disputes over the Peripheral Canal in California points to environmental
activism. The groundwater act in Arizona on the surface suggests con-
4. See P. Fradkin, A River No More (1984); J. Garreau, Nine Nations of North America (1982);
and P. Wiley & R. Gottlieb, Empires in the Sun (1982) [hereinafter Empires].
5. R. Dahl, Who Governs (1961); G. McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (1966).
6. D. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness (1984); N. Hundley, Water and the West
(1975); D. Mazmanian & P. Sabatier, Can Regulation Work (1983); M. Goodall, J. Sullivan & T.
DeYoung, California Water (1978).
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sideration of conservation values. However, the long term impact of these
events diminish when water policy in Los Angeles and Phoenix continue
to encourage urban growth. In short, urban growth continues unabated
in a water scarce region, and Western water policy enhances this pattern.
Conversely, conservation and environmental values have done little to
alter the direction of water policy in the West.
A dominant water elite is best observed over time. Western water policy
has a long tradition of reflecting the urban growth and development values
of a few economic elites. From time-to-time political conditions such as
the New Deal era, the post war boom, and the environmental movement
of the seventies help define the parameters of Western water policy.
Through it all, urban growth and development in the West remains un-
challenged as the region's top priority. Furthermore, the history of Western
water development reveals that the variety of values expected in pluralism
have not been translated into policy.7 An indicator of the serious consid-
eration of environmental and conservation values in Western water policy
would be to link population controls to water use regulations. However,
regardless of the general political climate, limiting growth to assure a
future water supply has not been a viable option. Thus, a longitudinal
approach to Western water policy reveals the staying power of elites and
the ineffectiveness of all other water interests to move beyond stop gap
measures and dent the elite core network. Consequently, our perspective
concentrates on the formation, expansion, and maintenance of an elite
dominated Western water policy.
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Elite dominance of Western water development can be divided into
four broad eras-specifically: (1) the Foundations of the Elites (1880s-
1920s, a period of private and small scale projects to enhance settlement);
(2) the Emergence of Elites (1920s-1930s, a period where a water re-
sources development ethic is adopted); (3) the Golden Age of Concrete
(1930s- 1960s, a period of large scale water projects financed by the federal
government to enhance regional development); and (4) Maintaining Elite
Controls (1970s to the present, a transition period where water elites
focus on state water institutions in the absence of federal interest). 8
Within each phase we identify core, semi-core, and peripheral partic-
7. N. Hundley, New Courses for the Colorado River 11-14 (G. Weatherford & F. Brown, Ist ed.
1986).
8. Four phases are derived from M. Reisner, supra note 2 passim (This historical narrative implies
four eras of Western water development); D. Worster, supra note 2 passim (This book provided us
with different conceptual stages of Western water development.); D. Pisani, supra note 6 passim
(Pisani details the decline of a key or core actor over time, in this case agriculture).
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ipants in Western water policy. The core participants are groups who
participate in and benefit from water resources policy in all four phases.
By and large, they are Los Angeles business groups who adapt water
projects as a means to enhance urban growth and development. Semi-
core actors are, in at least some of the phases, part of the elite decision-
making network. The major semi-core actors in Western water policy are
agriculture, San Diego, and Arizona. Third, peripheral water policy actors
are identified in each of the phases. These actors fail to have the major
tenets of their political philosophy translated into public policy. Peripheral
actors including environmentalists and limited growth activists remain
inconsequential even though Western water policy has undergone at least
four marked phases during the past century.
Core, semi-core, and peripheral water policy actors are identifiable by
their strategies, tactics, and operational modes of conduct. A strategy is
selecting an objective where one wishes to be at a future time. Tactics
are an immediate course of action to achieve objectives. There must also
be institutions, or operations, to carry out strategies and tactics.9 The use
of the term institutions should not be limited to formal government struc-
tures. Policy actors can also create informal bodies to generate goals and
objectives, and to implement policy. Thus, a less confining definition of
institutions might be to discuss operational modes of conduct. We define
operational modes of conduct as formal or informal mechanisms for
achieving policy goals and objectives. Used in tandem, strategies, tactics,
and operational modes of conduct are useful tools in achieving policy
success.
The dominant theme of the core elite is a strategy of cooperation and
a tactic of coercion.'" Cooperation is sought among the core participants
who share a growth and development ethic and who see water projects
as a means of achieving development. Core water elites employ subtle
coercive tactics, such as symbolic responses, to reassure semi-core and
peripheral actors' policy concerns. Peripheral actors, in the effort to counter
elite control of water policy, attempt to generate open conflict and hope
to force mutual consensus. In the operational context, this means pe-
ripheral actors are relegated to open forums such as state legislatures,
traditionally weak instruments of action in Western states. Semi-core
water interests adapt the same strategies and tactics as the elite core. The
difference is that semi-core actors are critical to building the coalitions
commonly associated with the distributive nature of water politics in the
West. The semi-core is less influential in both the agenda formation and
9. See F Emery & E. Trist, The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments 219-21 (J.
Shafrits & P. Whitbeck 2d ed. 1978).
10. Adapted from A. Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power (1979).
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policy implementation stages. At times, semi-core interests such as ag-
riculture receive symbolic assurance that water resources development is
advantageous for rural as well as urban needs.
The major task of the framework is to identify the actions of elite water
policy actors. Designating water interests as core elites, semi-core elites
and peripheral actors exposes the "real" policy makers from the symbolic
participants. The adaptable core water elites are at ease in any political
setting. Core water elites adapt a primary strategy of determining the
urban growth and development agenda." Tactics employed by the water
elite include in present politics the use of PAC's (in past times much
crasser uses of money), securing large scale federal water projects, and
symbolic legislative responses to non-elite (peripheral) policy objectives,
such as the 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act. Elite operational
modes of conduct are primarily gatekeeping structures designed to pro-
mote self regulation. Elites have sponsored institutions such as the Met-
ropolitan Water District (MWD) in California and the Department of Water
Resources (DWR) in Arizona.
The driving force behind water policy in the West is a few core growth
and development interests, or elites. Utilizing gatekeeping and self-reg-
ulation tactics, the core water elite limit the capacity of non-elite interests
to act as independent political forces.' 2 It is the core water elite which
dominates the politics of water by their ability to keep peripheral actors
at bay. Urban elite cooperation combined with subtle coercion of the
semi-core agricultural community has proven a successful technique in
adapting to changing political settings which we divided into four phases.
The overriding elite strategy in pursuing water resources development
remains constant over the four phases. First and foremost, elites seek
urban growth and development. Federal water projects became a quick
answer to enhance growth and development and effectively squelched
consideration of means other than water projects which might better serve
goals.' 3 However, changing political conditions generate new tactics and
operational modes of conduct to protect the overall water resources de-
velopment strategy. It is the changes in the tactics and operational modes
that is the focus of our study of elite water politics across four phases.
A detailed description of each phase and the core elite tactical and op-
erational response in each era of Western water resources development
follows.
Phase I, the Foundations of the Elites (1880s-1920s), is characterized
by a few small scale water projects. These projects are undertaken by
11. See R. Cobb & C. Elder, Participation in American Politics (1972).
12. D. Easton, A Systems Framework for Political Analysis (1971).
13. M. Reisner, supra note 2, at 359.
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individuals and privately held companies. Although limited in scale, many
of these early irrigation projects failed. In Phase 1, Western water users
began to realize that alternative sources of funding projects would have
to be found if water would be a key to growth. Specific characteristics
of Phase I include:
(1) Strategy-Elites begin to form linkages between water and growth
when federal interest in water projects develops.
(2) Elite tactics-Protect the "haves" over the "have-nots" through
"first-in-time, first-in-right" water laws.
(3) Operational context-Western water institutions in an infant state.
Day to day operations at the local level only.
Phase II, the Emergence of Elites (1 920s- 1930s), is a transition period
in Western water policy. Water elites in Southern California begin to
solidify into an urban and agriculture coalition. In these years, the federal
government takes the lead in selecting the projects, or the tactics to
produce regional development. The urban and rural core adapt accordingly
deciding that growth is best served by reclamation. General characteristics
of Phase II are:
(1) Strategy-Elite attempt to secure growth through water projects is
assured by federal interests in reclamation.
(2) Tactics-The core elite in Los Angeles use the Colorado River
Compact to secure first rights to Western water supplies available through
water projects.
(3) Operational context-Los Angeles elites create MWD to counter-
balance the power of agriculture and to serve as spokes-agency for South-
ern California in Washington.
(4) Non-elites emerge-These peripheral actors question elite tactics,
that is water for urban growth first, farming second. This is an urban/
rural conflict but non-elites are unable to bring about a consensus.
The New Deal era ushers in Phase III, the Golden Age of Concrete
(1930s-1960s). The construction of Hoover Dam signals that reclamation
projects will guide the development of the West. Within the region, MWD
fosters the growth and development strategies of urban elites in Southern
California. Together, MWD and the national water agencies become the
primary authors of water policy in the Colorado River region. Some of
the characteristics of Phase III include:
(1) Strategy-Los Angeles elites institutionalize the tie between water
projects and regional growth and development, fueling the distributive
politics of water.
(2) Tactics-L.A. water elites use MWD to eclipse federal authority
in planning and prioritizing needed water projects.
(3) Operational context-MWD and the emergence of a federal "iron
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triangle" effectively by-passes non-elite (peripheral actors) modes of ac-
countability, such as state government.
(4) Semi-core-Emergence of Arizona as a water elite. Solidifies the
distributive network.
(5) Non-elites-The core/semi-core distributive network prevents in-
trusion into water policy by peripheral actors.
Phase IV, Maintaining Elite Controls (1970s to the present), challenges
Los Angeles elites to find alternatives to large federal water projects. In
the struggle to hold down federal spending, the number of new recla-
mation projects is greatly reduced. In addition, states are asked to bear
a greater share of the costs of projects. In the West, semi-core actors
realize that the distributive coalition favors Los Angeles over other areas
in need of water, most notably Arizona. This struggle within the core
and semi-core is visible as early as California v. Arizona (1963) (dispute
over shares of water from the Colorado River). Phase IV benefits Phoenix
semi-core actors who desire a Los Angeles type of growth and devel-
opment in Arizona. Semi-core actors in Phoenix must force their hand
to get "real" benefits as opposed to Phase III where benefits "trickled-
down" from Los Angeles. Peripheral actors such as environmentalists are
still unable to make significant headway preventing (in their view) ex-
cessive and wasteful growth, this in spite of environmental laws passed
in the late sixties and early seventies. Attributes of Phase IV include:
(1) Strategy-Elite continue to pursue growth and development al-
though federal water projects are no longer a key component.
(2) Tactics-L.A. elites focus on MWD; Semi-core in Phoenix look
for their own water projects.
(3) Operational Context-L.A. relies on MWD to preserve existing
water empire. Phoenix creates DWR as a "mini-empire."
(4) Non-elites-Develop a clear "environmental" strategy, but few
effective operational modes of conduct.
The framework for analysis is applied to two Western States, California
and Arizona. In California, we focus on the emergence, consolidation,
and maintenance of water elites in the Los Angeles area, along the broad
eras or phases described above. In Arizona, we examine the politics of
water as practiced by elites in Phoenix. However, in the case of Arizona,
the emergence of an elite is delayed by the semi-core roles played by
Phoenix and agriculture in promoting Southern California's water re-
sources development. The Phoenix elite are observed emerging in the
1920s, consolidating in the early sixties, and maintaining roles really not
occurring until the 1980s. In other words, as the elite emerge and con-
solidate in Los Angeles, they adapt strategies, tactics, and operational
modes of conduct to take the lead in Western water policy. We then
Spring 19901
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demonstrate that Arizona is a follower in each phase and only emerges
as a separate elite in the last twenty years. Thus, the Californiazation of
Arizona water politics is an examination of how, over time, water elites
in Phoenix have learned the political/behavioral patterns practiced by
water elites in Los Angeles.
ELITE CONTROL OF FOUR PHASES OF WESTERN WATER
POLICY
Phase I: Foundations of the Elite
Beginning in the 1880s, Western water users are primarily small farm-
ers, large farms and ranches, mining interests, and emerging urban cen-
ters. Small farmers had few goals other than to obtain water for immediate
survival and quickly become peripheral participants. For the more estab-
lished farmer, water begins to be viewed as a tactic for achieving regional
economic growth and development. For example, Southern California
farmers start several small-scale private water districts but few are suc-
cessful. 4 Los Angeles also recognizes the importance of water to regional
growth in creating the Los Angeles Water Department which became
instrumental in building the L.A. Aquaduct. However, as with agriculture,
this operational mode of conduct emphasized the physical aspects of water
rather than the political aspects of water development. Nevertheless, these
early water projects establish the practice of solving "local" water short-
ages by importing water. By the 1920s, the formation of irrigation districts
to serve farmers and the L.A. Water Department establish the foundations
for a select few water users to dominate Southwestern water politics.' 5
Phase I in Arizona is marked by the political dominance of agriculture.
Landowners in the Phoenix area formed the Water Users Association and
adopted a "one-acre/one-vote" policy to control water rights.' 6 This de-
cision rule came to dominate valley water politics until the 1970s allowing
agriculture to take the lead in calling for water projects to augment Ari-
zona's water supply. Water law in Arizona provides the foundation for
agriculture to be a key player in water policy for years to come. Unlike
California, Arizona in Phase I gives little indication of being a major
competitor for water. The Phoenix valley is mostly rural. Few could
imagine Phoenix becoming a major urban center in competition for Ari-
zona's groundwater, controlled by agriculture, or Colorado River water,
controlled by Los Angeles and Southern California irrigators. Thus, the
14. M. Reisner, supra note 2, at 116.
15. Id.
16. Kyl, 1980 Groundwater Management Act: From Inception to Constitutional Challenge, U.
Colo. L. Rev. 471-503 (1982).
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underdeveloped state of Arizona is mostly a peripheral actor in Phase I.
However, the political domination of agriculture in Arizona provides the
opportunity for the Phoenix valley to become a semi-core participant in
later years. Other than a legal arena which gives preference to agriculture,
Arizona in Phase I has no strategy, let alone tactics or operations, to
formulate a water policy. As a consequence, California elites take the
lead in water policy in the region and Arizona follows along by default.
Phase II: The Emergence of Elites
In Phase II water elites employ tactics to secure a linkage between
regional growth and water resources. Tactically, the L.A. urban elite and
the agricultural elite discover that the Reclamation Service offers a cheap
and quick way to get water and subsequently promote growth. The bright
outlook on the water front had to be tempered somewhat, however, in
that doubting Eastern (and still dominant) Congressional interests are
willing to take a risk on only small projects. The first reclamation projects
are built in Arizona (Salt River Project) and in Nevada (Newlands Project),
not in California. 7
As this era progresses, L.A. elite also discover the Reclamation Service
has potential as an operational mode of conduct. In the effort to counter
Eastern apprehension, Western elites develop close ties to the BOR and
with Western Congressional leaders. This distributive network helps bring
more attention California's way. The formation of the Metropolitan Water
District (MWD) in 1926 provides yet another operational mechanism to
enact strategies and tactics. MWD serves to further demonstrate (1) the
right of Los Angeles to tap the Colorado River, (2) that Los Angeles is
the center of control for the distribution of imported water, and (3) that
California elites determine water policy even though the national gov-
ernment builds and pays for the water projects. Tactically, the 1922
Colorado River Compact reassures the California water elite that the river
will be developed and will primarily benefit California interests. Finally,
in 1928 the Boulder Canyon Act is passed by Congress, setting the stage
for construction of Hoover Dam, the Colorado River Aquaduct, and the
All-American Canal (projects which would turn Western water policy to
a decidedly Los Angeles focus in Phase III). "
The events of Phase II also reinforce the core, semi-core, and peripheral
nature of Western water interests. In a brief span of ten years, Los Angeles
urban interests establish themselves as the primary beneficiaries of the
Colorado River. The Compact, MWD, and the Boulder Canyon Act all
17. K. Smith, The Magnificent Experiment (1985); see also M. Reisner, supra note 2, at 116-
18.
18. M. Reisner, supra note 2, at 130.
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serve to bring Los Angeles politically close to a geographically distant
Colorado River. Agriculture is an active part of the core elite in creating
a distributive network. However, in the development and implementation
of policy, the agenda clearly focuses on Los Angeles. L.A. elite are
masterful in gaining cooperation from agriculture to promote distributive
water policy. However, L.A. elite learn in Phase II that agriculture, as
a semi-core member, can be subtly coerced to accept projects that benefit
Los Angeles first, and other water interests second.
Other water users such as an Arizona mining industry and an emerging
city in Phoenix are only symbolic participants in water resources devel-
opment. This is especially clear in the Colorado River Compact which
gave water to both California and Arizona but failed to clarify exact
shares. Given Los Angeles' head start in developing water institutions,
California took the upper hand in claiming the Colorado River. Arizona's
only immediate means of protest could be seen in the state legislature's
refusal to ratify the interstate compact. Arizona made a philosophically
correct decision but the action had only symbolic meaning. California
felt no obligation to alter its water strategy simply because Arizona did
not approve.
Phase III: Golden Age of Concrete
When Los Angeles growth and development interests create MWD,
these core elites institutionalized a strategy for growth linked to water
policy. It is likely the New Deal era and post war boom offered several
means to fuel regional growth. However, MWD and BOR institutionalized
water resources development as the primary growth vehicle. In Phase I11,
the Los Angeles core elite found in MWD an agency able to consolidate
control over the allocation of Western water supplies. In addition, MWD
becomes the core elite's long term planning agency for a narrow water
resources development agenda. The attractiveness of water projects is
sweetened by federally financed projects. With few discernible costs,
projects built between 1930 and the 1960s expanded bureaucratic growth
as much as regional development. Building simply to build helps sustain
the water elite. In Phase III there is no need to pick and choose projects,
the West simply takes them all.
Los Angeles water elites also have a strategy of constructing projects
in a pattern designed to keep the actual water supply one step ahead of
population projections. 9 In practice, excess water would be portioned
out to irrigated agriculture until needed for urban use. Building for later
urban use is evident in the completion schedule of Hoover Dam (1933),
the All-American Canal (1938), Shasta Dam (1944), and the San Diego
19. I. Cooper, supra note 2, at 250-51.
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Aqueducts (1944 and 1960). 20 In practice, agriculture receives short term
benefits from the projects making use of surplus water until needed by
urban users in Los Angeles. The trickle down elite arrangement is also
apparent in the construction of San Diego's aqueducts only after Los
Angeles has a pipeline to the Colorado River. Lacking political clout in
the elite distributive network, San Diego must rely on MWD for water
imports. San Diego becomes a semi-core partner to Los Angeles in Phase
III further reinforcing MWD's role as the hub of Western water policy.
By emphasizing MWD as the primary water agency of Southern Cal-
ifornia, local water elites could bypass other operational modes or insti-
tutions such as the State Water Office and the state legislature. Irrigation
districts and other agencies such as the San Diego Water Authority also
operated through MWD rather than deal directly with Washington. By
1960, California water interests had created over 160 irrigation districts,
55 reclamation districts, and hundreds of municipal districts. Still, only
MWD spoke with consistent authority in water conversations involving
California and the national government. 2 '
Water resources development in Arizona is, for the most part, in a
holding pattern during Phase 11I. Arizona's desperate tactic to oppose the
Colorado River Compact had failed miserably. The federal government
shows little interest in Arizona as California and MWD dominate the
federally funded agenda in the Golden Age of Concrete. Until federal
water agencies would show interest in Arizona, water elites in growing
urban centers like Phoenix have no incentive to form an institutional link
with Washington. In fact, left to go it alone, Arizona's urban elites could
have found the effort counterproductive, exposing development strategies
prior to having the political clout to protect their interests from peripheral
challenges. Furthermore, agriculture controlled the Arizona courts, the
only existing operational mode to determine water policy. An expanding
agribusiness found no reason to experiment with other operational modes
of conduct when the system in place clearly protected rural uses of ground-
water.22
Arizona does not begin to directly benefit from the Golden Age of
Concrete until the 1960s. In 1963 the dispute over Arizona's share of the
Colorado River, so long left unsettled by the Compact, ends in Arizona's
favor. Arizona's only Phase III water development would be the Central
Arizona Project (CAP). However, the inattentiveness to Arizona's water
needs for most of Phase III creates problems in distributing and managing
a newly found water supply. Although Phoenix shows signs of becoming
20. Id. at 420-21.
21. W. Kahn, supra note 2, at 421-22.
22. Kyl, supra note 16, at 471-503.
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a major urban center in Phase III, agriculture controls the politics of water
within the state and the city has no voice outside the state to counter the
power of MWD. This failure to prepare for a much needed water project
delays efforts to obtain the CAP for nearly twenty years. Thus, Arizona's
urban interests are at best semi-core actors in Phase Ill, revealing only
a few signs that Phoenix would push to replace agriculture as Arizona's
core elite.
MAINTAINING ELITE CONTROLS (1970s TO THE PRESENT)
The fourth phase in California is marked by the onset of diminishing
returns. The most crucial diminishing return for Los Angeles is the re-
alization that water supply issues are no longer the only key political
issue. In Phase III, water projects provide the foundation for economic
growth. Now in Phase IV, new keys to growth emerge such as the hi-
tech industry and Pacific Rim financing which build on the sturdy water
foundation. In the effort to preserve the water foundation, the L.A. elite
in Phase IV protect MWD as the primary water policy operational mode
of conduct. The challenge to elites in Phase IV is to deflect non-elites
from intruding on MWD policy making. Furthermore, as non-elites such
as environmentalists become commonplace in the seventies and eighties,
institutions created to serve their values such as the California EPA fail
to penetrate the elite controlled MWD. Thus, through effective gate-
keeping the L.A. elite are able to cope with increasing peripheral non-
elite policy activity by defecting non-elite values to operational modes
of conduct that rarely directly challenge the elite core water allocation
network.
As water supply issues became less central to growth and development,
a new element emerged in water policy which emphasized environmental
quality, an issue heretofore ignored by policy makers. In 1969, the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) serves to formalize public op-
position to water projects deemed harmful to the environment. In California,
environmental values enjoyed their heyday in the Jerry Brown adminis-
tration. The Peripheral Canal, Tulare Basin, and Mono Lake issues are
often cited as examples of important non-elite (peripheral) victories in
Western water policy.23 However, in Brown's second term as Governor
it become clearer that water elites adopt a "waiting 'em out" tactic,
hoping for a more friendly administration in the eighties. Evidence of
water elites buying time can be seen in Brown's signing of the second
phase of the controversial State Water Project in 1980.24 Thus, in spite
of Jerry Brown's environmental allegiances, the former governor also
23. Empires, supra note 4, at 87-89.
24. Id. at 87, 91.
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recognized Southern California's central and powerful role in Western
growth and development by maintaining ties to Southern California water
elites.
The current strategy for Southern California water elites is to wait for
clear policy windows to implement growth strategies through water proj-
ects. It appears that the "waiting 'em out" tactic is continuing in the
Deukmajian administration. The overall water elite view toward the gov-
ernor's office reflects an effort to minimize further setbacks to core L.A.
elite policy goals. The pace of water resources development has clearly
slowed in Phase IV. However, the overall maturing of California's econ-
omy permits less dependence on water projects as the sole key to growth.
The L.A. core elite operational modes of conduct also reflect an em-
phasis to maintain the existing water policy network rather than a Phase
III expansionist attitude. Budget problems at the national level, a shift
toward state control of water policy, and environmental laws such as
NEPA turn the focus of MWD toward preserving the core elite water
agenda in mostly state political settings. Once relegated to state level
politics the water elite formally confront values that never existed or
surfaced in the first three phases. In Phase IV, MWD must deal directly
with Northern California rather than via a federal water agency. Rather
than waiting for the national government to develop the Northwest for
Southern California's benefit, the L.A. water elite independently take on
the task. Although MWD could control the agenda in Southern California,
L.A. water elites are not willing to practice the politics of consensus to
reach agreement with their Northern counterparts. Unwilling to compro-
mise their core values of growth and development, the L.A. core elite
choose to control what they can for the moment through MWD and wait
for other opportunities to implement their strategies, finding tactics less
likely to be challenged. In this effort, finding alternatives to water projects
as the only key to growth becomes an essential part of the elite strategy.
The formation of the Los Angeles 25, a group of urban business leaders,
is an important step in linking the plans of Los Angeles with MWD. 5
Absent national leadership to link water policy with development of the
West, the L.A. 25 and MWD cooperate to preserve Los Angeles' water
needs first, all other uses second. The desire to preserve the status of Los
Angeles in water decisionmaking impacts traditional semi-core actors.
San Diego, for example has shown indications of seeking its own water
deals with the Imperial Irrigation District.26 In searching for an indepen-
dent water market, San Diego also reflects the politics of water in Phase
25. Id. at 114-15.
26. Hartshorn, Door Open to Water Trades. W. Water (Sep./Oct. 1985) at 1-3; and Hartshorn,
Water Trading in the Imperial Valley, W. Water (July/Aug. 1985) at I.
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IV. No longer can Los Angeles guarantee water for its semi-core partners.
Furthermore, semi-core members like San Diego become increasingly
aware in Phase IV that the absence of federal funding means L.A. elites
can only think about Los Angeles. Benefits to the semi-core in Phase III
were limited to begin with. Now in Phase IV the semi-core would gain
incentive to develop their own growth strategies or permit peripheral
actors such as environmentalists and "no-growth" activists to dominate
water policy.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Arizona. By the 1970s, urban
elites in Phoenix are challenged by the federal government to define the
benefits of the CAP, responding to the attitude toward curbing large scale
water projects. Arizona found itself alone in conversations with Wash-
ington and desperately needing a unified voice to convey its desire for
the CAP. A small set of elites acting alone would expose the CAP as an
old style project that benefits only one party, in this case Phoenix. This
possibility had to be squelched especially when we consider the original
intent of the CAP was to assist agriculture.27 Furthermore, the relationship
between Phoenix and agriculture is already strained by an increasing
number of court cases challenging rights to groundwater for irrigation
when clearly the cities displayed a higher economic use of the state's
groundwater." With ninety percent of the state's groundwater bottled up
in agricultural uses, any discussion of bringing the CAP to Arizona would
have to include the impact of the CAP on agriculture and groundwater
use.
29
Phoenix elites understand that their old style Charter Government Com-
mittee, designed to promote urban interests, would not help get the CAP.
In Phase III, the Committee spoke for Phoenix while agriculture domi-
nated politics statewide. The Committee formulated policy in public works,
zoning, and screened potential political candidates. In fact, between 1947
and 1976 only two city council candidates gain election without Com-
mittee approval." Clearly this open handed style of political influence is
not very useful in expanding support for the CAP to other key actors
such as Agriculture already skeptical of Phoenix's motives in wanting
the CAP. Phoenix elites such as Frank Snell and Eugene Pulliam re-
sponded to the challenge by organizing the Phoenix 40, an entity not
dissimilar to the Los Angeles 25. The organization is not a formal
decisionmaking forum but rather an oversight board serving to review
City policy questions and to intervene informally on occasion to get the
27. Empires, supra note 4, at 177.
28. Kyl, supra note 16, at 471-503.
29. Empires, supra note 4, at 178-79.
30. Id. at 172.
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policy wheels in motion.3' Forming the Phoenix 40 is a critical de-
velopment in continuing elite politics in Phoenix. For the first time,
Arizona experiences the benefits of creating informal operational modes
of conduct which in turn brought adroit manipulation of the agenda and
of state institutions. The Phoenix elite employed cooperation and coercion
as practiced among the L.A. elite. Learning to adjust to their political
environment, Phoenix developers create a less crass policy making group
called the Phoenix 40.
The Phoenix 40 became the only way to overcome the power vacuum
that developed in Arizona during Phase III. Between 1960 and 1980 the
state's population had doubled from 1.3 to 2.6 million.32 Phoenix now
emerges as a major urban center that dwarfs agriculture (the Phase III
core actor) in every way except in water policy. In this area, the Phoenix
40 answer the challenge by working behind the scenes with Governor
Babbitt to fashion groundwater legislation which would secure water for
Phoenix first and the rest of Arizona second.33 The BOR insisted Arizona
pass a water conservation law in order to get the CAP. In doing so, the
Phoenix elites take the lead in drafting the bill and passing the law in a
Phoenix dominated state legislature. The 1980 Arizona Groundwater
Management Act created the Department of Water Resources (DWR) and
several locally controlled Active Management Areas (AMAs). These
agencies exist under the banner of conservation but in fact they currently
show signs of fulfilling the strategies of the Phoenix elite to expand the
growth of Arizona's major urban center. Close examination of the Act
reveals there is no ceiling on overall water use in the cities but rather
only limits per capita consumption. Further, agriculture is now metered
for its use of groundwater and there is the possibility of losing groundwater
rights in future years if irrigation limits are not met.34 In essence, the
DWR and its Phoenix AMA show signs of performing roles similar to
those played by MWD on behalf of the L.A. 25.
Arizona's water elites have barely reaped the benefits of large-scale
water projects and are now also challenged to maintain control of their
new waterinstitutions. Environmentalists have raised concerns over water
quality and water conservation. However, Phoenix elites have so far kept
these issues from directly influencing DWR, a signal that the core elite
are learning the value of gatekeeping structures. In Tucson, citizen activist
groups have expressed concern over growth with depleting groundwater
supplies one of several related issues. (The Tucson Active Management
31. Id. at 174.
32. Ariz. Stat. Rev. (1986).
33. Empires, supra note 4, at 117-18.
34. W. Martin & H. Ingram, Planning for Growth in the Southwest 7-9 (1985).
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Area's management plans are somewhat responsive to these views.)35
However, the net effect seems to be a Tucson which will grow at a slower
pace than Phoenix. The challenge to the Phoenix elite is avoiding a
confrontation with Tucson over water conservation regulations which
appear to have little impact in Phoenix yet force real cutbacks in Tucson.
Finally, agriculture appears to be heading towards peripheral participation.
Economic studies in Arizona as early as the 1960s suggested the CAP
could not in and of itself prevent the decline of agriculture.3 6 Those
predictions now seem to be coming true. There are now indications that
the CAP has served mostly to ease the impact of the shift from a rural
to urban economy.37
CONCLUSION
An elite perspective toward Western water policy reveals a select group
of water policy makers identified as "core" elites. The core elite are
primarily urban business leaders who guide water resources development
as a means of promoting urban growth and development. Semi-core actors
are also identifiable. They include agriculture, San Diego, and Arizona.
It is important for the core elite to cooperate with the semi-core in order
to form the coalitions necessary to limit the scope of the water agenda.
The semi-core is less involved in policy implementation. The L.A. urban
core and more recently the Phoenix urban core often provide symbolic
benefits to semi-core participants. The framework also reveals non-elite
or peripheral actors in California and Arizona. Peripheral actors are en-
vironmentalists and "limited growth" citizen activists. The Los Angeles
and Phoenix examples provide indication that the net effect of peripheral
actors is marginal. While there are examples of peripheral actors achieving
policy outputs, the efforts of non-elites have done little to change the
outcome of water politics dominated by urban elites.
It is also useful to examine Western water policy over time. The division
of Western water policy across phases clarifies the dynamics of elite
controlled water policy. By focusing on an elite perspective, the longevity
of Western water elites is revealed and the inability of non-elites to alter
elite decisions is also displayed. Political conditions change and water
elites have adjusted accordingly. This can be observed through the strat-
egies, tactics, and operational modes of conduct employed by elites to
35. Id.
36. M. Kelso, W. Martin & L. Mack, Water Supplies and Economic Growth (1986); see also
D. Mann, The Politics of Water in Arizona (1963) and H. Ingram, Patterns of Politics in Water
Resources Development (1969).
37. W. Parsons & D. Mathews, The Californiazation of Arizona Water Politics (March 27, 1987)
(paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association).
[Vol. 30
ARIZONA WATER POLJTICS
(1) develop a foundation for control, (2) emerge as an elite, (3) expand
their power in the golden age of concrete, and (4) maintain control in
contemporary political settings, hence the four phases of Western water
politics. It is especially important to convey the significance of elites
maintaining control in Phase IV. The diversity of the periphery now
expands into policy areas such as environmentalism. Nevertheless, non-
elites have failed to penetrate core elite operational modes of conduct.
Los Angeles elites still control MWD. Similarly, Phoenix elites have
fashioned the 1980 Groundwater Act so that in creating DWR Arizona
water policy will focus on urban water use. By regulating in favor of
urban water use, DWR reflects the change in elite water strategy to favor
urban centers over agriculture. The shake out of agriculture indicates the
desire of the elites to maintain their control of water policy even at the
expense of a traditional participant. Finally, an analysis of elites over
time reveals that even though California and Arizona are two different
states, water elites in both states practice a very similar style of politics
including gatekeeping structures and symbolic responses to non-elites.
Studying elites over four phases shows that policy choices available to
elites can change but the overall goals of elites and the narrow membership
of the core elite remains in spite of indications of increased participation
in Western water policy.
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